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In recent literature, it has been widely discussed why the U.S. current ac-
count has deteriorated dramatically during the past decade (see, among
others, Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 2004; Roubini and Setser, 2004; Blanchard,
Giavazzi, and Sa, 2005). Although the U.S. current account had been in
deﬁcit for most of the 1980s and 1990s, its deﬁcits were almost balanced by
Japan’s current account surpluses until the mid-1990s. However, the U.S.
current account started to show a dramatic deterioration after 1997 and is
now far from balanced by surpluses of the other industrialized countries
(see ﬁgure 2.1). The ﬁrst strand of studies proposed that the recent deteri-
oration in the U.S. current account primarily reﬂects a decline of the U.S.
domestic saving and an increase in the U.S. demand for foreign goods. The
second strand of studies, in contrast, pointed out that an increase in the
global supply of saving, especially an increase in Asian and Middle East-
ern savings, would help to explain the increase in the U.S. current account
deﬁcit. In particular, these studies stress a remarkable reversal in global
capital ﬂows that has transformed emerging-market economies from bor-
rowers to large net lenders in international capital markets (see, for ex-
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When looking at the recent remarkable reversal in global capital ﬂows,
East Asian economies have been one of the major net lenders after the cur-
rency crisis in 1997. Table 2.1 reports total trade balances of eight East
Asian economies from 1990 to 2004. It also reports their trade balances
against the United States and the other trade partners. It shows that except
for Hong Kong and the Philippines, the East Asian economies had trade
balance surpluses in total after the crisis. In particular, except for the
Philippines, they have had big trade balance surpluses against the United
States since the crisis and the surpluses have widened in the 2000s. The
trade balance surpluses have been one of the main sources of the U.S. cur-
rent account deﬁcits since the late 1990s, especially since the early 2000s.
In this paper, we explore some theoretical and empirical implications of
the changed international capital ﬂows in East Asian economies after the
currency crisis. During the crisis, East Asian economies with smaller liquid
foreign assets had a hard time preventing panics in ﬁnancial markets and
sudden reversals in capital ﬂows (see, for example, Corsetti, Pesenti, and
Roubini 1999 and Sachs and Radelet 1998). Many developing countries
thus came to recognize that increased liquidity is an important self-
protection against crises. Among the strategies for the self-protection, re-
placing liquid short-term debt by illiquid long-term debt was initially one
popular advice that many economists suggested. However, what most
Asian economies took more seriously was raising foreign reserves (see, for
example, Aizenman and Lee 2005 and Rodrik 2005). Foreign exchange 
reserves held by developing nations, especially East Asian economies, 
are now record-breaking and stand at levels that are a multiple of those
held by advanced countries. The purpose of this paper is to show that
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Fig. 2.1 Current account balances of the U.S., Japan, and Germany











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.macroeconomic impacts will be very diﬀerent depending on which strategy
developing countries take for self-protection.
In the ﬁrst part of this paper, we investigate what impacts an increased
aversion to liquidity risk can have on current account and the other macro-
economic variables in a simple open economy model. In the model, each
representative agent maximizes the utility function over time. Since Obst-
feld and Rogoﬀ (1997), usefulness of utility-based models has been widely
recognized. A key feature in our model is that relative size of net foreign liq-
uid debt to foreign reserve reduces the utility. This is one of the simplest
forms that capture costs from holding liquid foreign debts. At period  ,
there is an unanticipated shock that increases aversion to liquidity risk.
When the government keeps the amount of foreign reserves constant, the
increased aversion among private individuals reduces liquid debt and in-
creases illiquid debt. However, because the sum of liquid and illiquid debts
does not change much, the macroeconomic impacts are not large, causing
only small current account surpluses. In contrast, when both private indi-
viduals and the government respond to an unanticipated increase of liq-
uidity risk aversion, the increased aversion increases foreign reserves and
may lead to a rise of liquid debt. In particular, under some reasonable pa-
rameter set, it causes large macroeconomic impacts, including current ac-
count surpluses accompanied by depreciation of the real exchange rate.
In the second part of the paper, we provide some empirical evidence in
East Asia that supports to the theoretical implications. In particular, we
focus on the changes of foreign debt maturity structures and their implica-
tions in East Asian economies. We ﬁnd that many East Asian economies
temporarily reduced short-term borrowings soon after the crisis, but in-
creased short-term borrowings in the early 2000s. Since short-term debt is
liquid debt, the former change after the crisis is consistent with the case
where only private agents respond to the increased aversion to liquidity
risk. However, the latter change is consistent with the case where the gov-
ernment also started to respond and accumulated substantial foreign ex-
change reserves.
Since macroeconomic impacts of the increased liquidity risk aversion
depend on which strategy the East Asian economies take, our results have
several important implications. In particular, by accumulating foreign ex-
change reserves, the U.S. dollar is the dominant reserve currency in the
currency compositions. This suggests that substantial rises in foreign ex-
change reserves will increase capital inﬂows into the United States. We
point out that trade account surpluses have been widening against the
United States, but not against non-U.S. countries in several Asian econ-
omies in the 2000s. Finally, we ﬁnd that there were substantial deprecia-
tions of East Asian real exchange rates against the U.S. dollar even after the
economies recovered from the crisis. We point out that the result is also
consistent with the model.
42 Shin-ichi Fukuda and Yoshifumi KonThere are several previous studies that address determinants of debt ma-
turity structure. For example, Rodrik and Velasco (1999) argue that inter-
national investors with informational disadvantages may choose to lend
short-term to better monitor and discipline borrowers (see also Fukuda
2001 and Jeanne, 2004). Broner, Lorenzoni, and Schmukler (2004) argue
that emerging economies borrow short term due to the high risk premium
charged by international capital markets on long-term debt (see also
Schmukler and Vesperoni, 2006). However, unlike ours, none of them dis-
cussed interactions between debt maturity and foreign reserves that pre-
vailed in emerging markets in the late 1990s and the early 2000s.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 sets up our small open econ-
omy model and section 2.3 discusses its implications under constant for-
eign reserves. Section 2.4 discusses macroeconomic consequences when
the government chooses foreign reserves so as to minimize its loss function,
and section 2.5 presents the simulation results. Section 2.6 shows some
supporting evidence in East Asia, and section 2.7 considers an implication
for the U.S. current account deﬁcits. Section 2.8 discusses implications for
real exchange rates. Section 2.9 summarizes our main results and refers to
their implications.
2.2 A Small Open Economy Model
The main purpose of our theoretical model is to investigate macroeco-
nomic consequences when the economy suddenly increased its aversion to
liquidity risk. We consider a small open economy that produces two com-
posite goods, tradables and nontradables. For analytical simplicity, we as-
sume that outputs of tradables and nontradables, yT and yN respectively,
are ﬁxed and constant over time. Each representative agent in the economy






t j)   C( bA
t j, Rt j)], 0    ,
where ct
T   consumption of tradable good, ct
N   consumption of nontrad-
able good, bt
A   net liquid debt, bt
B   net illiquid debt, and Rt   foreign re-
serve. The parameter   is a discount factor such that 0    1. Subscript
t denotes time period. The utility function U(cT
t j, cN
t j) is increasing and
strictly concave in cT
t j and cN
t j, while the disutility function C( bA
t j, Rt j)
is strictly increasing and strictly convex in bA
t j.
The budget constraint of the representative agent is:
(2) bA
t 1   bB
t 1   (1   r A)bt
A   (1   rB)bt
B   yT   pt
NyN   ct
T   pt
Nct
N   Tt
where Tt is lump-sum tax, pt
N is the price of nontradable goods, r A is real
interest rate of liquid debt, and r B is real interest rate of illiquid debt. For
simplicity, we assume that r A   r B   (1/ ) – 1. The assumption that rA   rB
reﬂects a liquidity premium that makes real interest rate of liquid debt
Liquidity Risk Aversion, Debt Maturity, and Current Account Surpluses 43lower than that of illiquid debt. Since the numeraire is the traded good, the
real interest rates and the price of nontradable goods are deﬁned in terms
of tradables.
A key feature in equation (1) is that net liquid debt and foreign reserve
are in the utility function. In our model, net supply of domestic debt is al-
ways zero, so that bt
A denotes net liquid foreign debt. We assume that the
relative size of net liquid foreign debt to foreign reserve reduces the utility.
This is one of the simplest forms that capture potential costs from hold-
ing liquid foreign debts. Panics in ﬁnancial markets and sudden reversals 
in capital ﬂows are more likely to happen when the country has higher 
(net) levels of liquid foreign debts, but are less likely when it has higher lev-
els of foreign reserves. To the extent that ∂C( bA
t j, Rt j)/∂( bA
t j)   0 and
∂C( bA
t j, Rt j)/∂Rt j   0, the function C( bA
t j, Rt j) is a reduced form that
captures the disutility from such potential costs.
One may interpret the function C( bA
t j, Rt j) as a shopping time model
where either a decline of bt
A or a rise of Rt saves labor time for reducing liq-
uidity risk. In a closed economy, ﬁat money provides such liquidity services
in the money-in-the-utility function model. In a small open economy that
has a potential liquidity risk, either a decrease of liquid foreign debt or an
increase of foreign reserve provides a similar service. In the following anal-
ysis, we assume that ∂2C( bA
t j, Rt j)/∂( bA
t j)∂Rt j   0. The assumption re-
ﬂects the fact that a foreign reserve accumulation relieves the marginal
disutility from increased liquid foreign debt. The parameter   represents
the degree of risk aversion to potential liquidity shocks. An increased aver-
sion to liquidity risk generally increases the marginal disutility from the in-
creased liquid foreign debt.
The ﬁrst-order conditions are derived by maximizing the following
Lagrangian:





t j)   C( bA




 j t j[bA
t 1 j   bB
t 1 j   (1   r A) bA
t j   (1   rB)bB
t j
  yT   pN
t j yN   cT
t j   pN
t jcN
t j   T t j].
It holds that ct
N  yN in equilibrium. Assuming interior solutions, the ﬁrst-
order conditions thus lead to:
(4a) ∂U(ct




T    t,
(4c)  ∂C( bA
t 1, Rt 1)/∂( bA
t 1)   (rB   rA) t 1.
Since the numeraire is the traded good, the price of nontradable good pt
N
denotes the real exchange rate of this small open economy at time t, where
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N means depreciation of the real exchange rate. Equation (4a)
thus implies that the real exchange rate depreciates when yN increases.
Equation (4b) determines the amount of consumption of tradable good.
Equation (4c) implies that the amount of liquid foreign debt bt
A is inversely
related with the amount of foreign reserves Rt. This is because foreign re-
serves, which reduce liquidity risk, allow the representative agent to hold
more liquid foreign debt.
Under the assumption that r B   (1/ ) – 1 where the real interest rate of
illiquid debt is equal to the rate of time preference, Lagrangian multiplier





A   bt
B are constant over time without
unanticipated external shocks.1 However, an unanticipated change of the
parameter   aﬀects the equilibrium values of these variables. In particular,
the parameter   aﬀects the choice between liquid and illiquid foreign debts
because of potential costs from holding liquid foreign debt, and may aﬀect
the current account of the economy.
2.3 The Macroeconomic Impacts under Constant Foreign Reserves
The main purpose of the following analysis is to explore the impacts
when the economy suddenly increased its aversion to liquidity risk. To
achieve this goal, we explore what impacts an unanticipated change of  
has on various macroeconomic variables. This section ﬁrst considers the
case where the amounts of foreign reserves Rt and lump-sum tax Tt are ex-
ogenously given and remain constant over time. Under the balanced bud-
get, the government issues no bond to ﬁnance its activity. This corresponds
to the case where only private individuals respond to an unanticipated in-
crease of disutility from liquidity risk.
Suppose that there was an unanticipated increase of   at period  . Then,
both ct
T and pt
N instantaneously jump to the new steady state at period  ,
while both bt
A and bt
A   bt
B move to the new steady state at period   1.
Since ct
N   yN, the budget constraint thus leads to:
(5a) 0   rB(b0
A   b0
B)   (rB   rA)b0
A   yT   c0
T   T,
(5b) b1
A   b1
B   (1   rB)(b0
A   b0
B)   (rB   rA)b0
A   yT   c1
T   T,
(5c) 0   rB(b1
A   b1
B)   (rB   rA)b1
A   yT   c1
T   T,
where the variables with subscript 0 are those in the old steady state and the
variables with subscript 1 are those in the new steady state. Denoting the
change of the variable x’s steady state value by  x, it therefore holds that:
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1. When rB   (1/ ) – 1, Lagrangian multiplier  t changes over time and consequently some
macrovariables such as ct
T have a time trend. However, even when rB   (1/ ) – 1, a basic mes-
sage in the following analysis is essentially the same.(6)  (bA   bB)    bA    cT.
Since equations (4b) and (4c) respectively imply that:
(7a)       cT,
(7b)  2  bA       bA       (rB   rA)  ,
we also obtain:
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where      2[∂2C/∂( bA
t 1)2] – [(rB – rA)2/(1   rB)][∂2U(cT, yN)/∂cT2]   0.
Since there is no net supply of domestic debt, bt
A and bt
B denote net liq-
uid foreign debt and net illiquid foreign debt respectively. Equations (8a)
and (8b) thus imply that the unanticipated decline of   decreases not only
the amount of net foreign liquidity debt, but also the sum of net foreign liq-
uidity and illiquidity debts. Since the economy’s current account balance
over period t is deﬁned by:
(9) CAt   [(bt
A   bt
B)   (bA
t 1   bB
t 1)]   (Rt 1   Rt),
they also indicate that an unanticipated decline of   improves the current
account at period t because  Rt is constant over time. However, since 
 (bA   bB)   [(rB – rA)/(1   rB)]  bA, the change of bA   bB is much smaller
than the change of bAbecause (rB– rA)/(1  rB) is small. This implies that the
increased aversion may have a limited impact on the sum of net foreign
debts, although it changes the component of net foreign debts substantially
through decreasing liquid foreign debt and increasing illiquid debt when
private individuals increase disutility from liquidity risk.
The inequality (8c) implies that  cT/     0. Therefore, equations (4a)
and (4b) lead that  pN/     0. These inequalities imply that an unantici-
pated increase in the aversion decreases consumption of tradable good and
leads to the depreciation of the real exchange rate. Since rB   rA, the shift
from liquidity debt to illiquid debt increases the burden of total interest
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46 Shin-ichi Fukuda and Yoshifumi KoncT and pN. However, to the extent that the sum of liquid and illiquid debts
does not change much, the macroeconomic impacts are not large, causing
only small current account surpluses.
2.4 The Government Loss Minimization Problem
In the last section, we assumed that the amount of foreign reserves is ex-
ogenously given. This exercise is useful to see macroeconomic conse-
quences when only private individuals respond to an unanticipated in-
crease in the aversion to liquidity risk. It is, however, natural that the
government also chooses the amount of foreign reserves so as to minimize
the social costs. The purpose of this section is to explore what impacts an
unanticipated change of liquidity risk aversion has on various macroeco-
nomic variables, especially the current account balance, when both private
individuals and the government respond to an unanticipated increase in
the disutility from liquidity risk. In the analysis, we assume that the gov-
ernment minimizes the following loss function:




t j, Rt j).
In equation (10), the government losses arise solely from disutility from
liquidity risk. The government’s loss function, CG( GbA
t j, Rt j), is strictly
decreasing and strictly convex in Rt j. This reﬂects the fact that foreign re-
serves relieve the country’s liquidity risk. The parameter  G represents the
degree of the government’s aversion to the potential liquidity risk, where
∂CG( GbA
t j, Rt j)/∂( GbA
t j)   0. An increased aversion to the risk generally
increases the marginal loss from decreased foreign reserves because
∂2CG( GbA
t j, Rt j)/∂( GbA
t j)∂Rt j   0. We allow that the government’s dis-
utility function CG( GbA
t j, Rt j) is generally diﬀerent from that of the rep-
resentative private agent C ( bA
t j, Rt j).
When increasing the amount of foreign reserves, the government has al-
ternative methods to ﬁnance it. However, because of the Ricardian equiv-
alence, the government method of ﬁnance does not aﬀect resource alloca-
tion. We thus focus on the case where the increases of the foreign reserves
are solely ﬁnanced by lump-sum tax increases. In this case, the government
budget constraint at period t is written as:
(11) Tt   G*   Rt 1   (1   r) Rt,
where G*is exogenous government expenditure and ris real interest rate of
the foreign reserves. We assume that the rate of returns from foreign re-
serves is very low in international capital market, so that r   rA   rB.
Assuming interior solution, the government’s ﬁrst-order conditions that
minimize (10) lead to:
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Equation (12) means that the government changes the amount of foreign
reserves up to the satiation point. Equations (11) and (12), together with
equations (4a)–(4c) and (5a)–(5c), determine the equilibrium allocation
when the government chooses the amount of foreign reserves so as to min-
imize the loss function.
Since there is no net supply of domestic debt, both bt
A and bt
B are net for-
eign debts, the sum of which is still constant without external shocks even
when the government chooses the amount of foreign reserves endoge-
nously. However, unanticipated changes of   and  G aﬀect the equilibrium
allocation. Suppose that there were unanticipated increases of   and  G at
period  . Then, both ct
T and pt
N instantaneously jump to the new steady
state at period  , while three stock variables bt
A, bt
A bt
B, and Rtmove to the
new steady state at period   1. Since ct
N   yN, the budget constraints in
periods   – 1,  , and   1 respectively lead to:
(13a) 0   rB(b0
A   b0
B)   (rB   rA) b0
A   yT   c0
T   G*   rR0,
(13b) b1
A   b1
B   (1   rB)(b0
A   b0
B)   (rB   rA) b0
A
  yT   c1
T   G*   R1   (1   r)R0,
(13c) 0   rB(b1
A   b1
B)   (rB   rA) b1
A   yT   c1
T   G*   rR1,
where the variables with subscript 0 are those in the old steady state, and
the variables with subscript 1 are those in the new steady state. It therefore
holds that:
(14)  (bA   bB)    R    cT      bA      R.
The condition (14) degenerates into the condition (6) when  R   0. How-
ever, since  R   0 when the government optimally chooses R, the follow-
ing results become very diﬀerent from those in the last section.
When the government chooses the amount of foreign reserves endoge-
nously, equation (4c) implies:
(15)  2    bA       bA            R
  (rB   rA)  ,
while equation (4b) still leads to (7a). Since equation (12) leads to:
(16)  G    bA   bA     G      R   0,
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where  , which is positive, was deﬁned following equations (8a)–(8c).
As you see in (17a),  R/   depends on various derivatives and parame-
ters. Therefore, we cannot conclude that  R/   is positive in general.
However, to the extent that the government chooses the amount of fo-
reign reserves to minimize the liquidity risk, it is natural to suppose that 
the government increases R when aversion to liquidity risk increases. We 
thus focus on the case where  R/     0 in the following analysis. When
 R/     0, equation (17b) implies that  bA/   depends on two opposite
eﬀects. One is (–1/ )[∂C/∂( bA)    bA∂2C/∂( bA)2] that is negative, reﬂect-
ing the private agent’s responses to the increased aversion to liquidity risk.
The other is (– / )[∂2CG/∂( bA)∂R]( R/  ) that is positive, reﬂecting the
government’s responses to the increased aversion to liquidity risk. The sign
of  bA/   generally depends on which eﬀect is bigger.
Given  bA/   and  R/  , equations (17c) and (17d) determine  (bA  
bB – R)/  ,  cT/  , and   /  . The signs of  (bA   bB – R)/  ,  cT/  ,
and    /   in general depend on whether (r B –  r) R is bigger than 
(r B – rA) bA or not. Since the current account balance over period t is still
deﬁned by (9), this indicates that the eﬀect on the current account is not
clear. However, when  bA/     0, we can pin down the signs of  (bA  
bB – R)/  ,  cT/  , and   /  . In this case, the macroeconomic impacts
of an unanticipated change of   work in the same directions as those in the
last section, even if both the government and private individuals increase
disutility from liquidity risk.
Moreover, to the extent that (r B– r) R (r B– r A) bA, the conditions (17c)
and (17d) imply that an unanticipated increase of  leads to a temporal im-
provement of the current account when the economy moves from the old
steady state to the new steady state, and that the increase of   reduces the
amount of tradable consumption and leads to the depreciation of the real
exchange rate. When the government increases foreign reserves substan-
tially, the representative private agent may not need to increase costly illiq-
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Liquidity Risk Aversion, Debt Maturity, and Current Account Surpluses 49very low, the private agent’s disposal income declines through increasing
lump-sum tax. Given consumption of nontradable goods, this may de-
crease both cT and pN and derive a temporal improvement of the current
account.
It is noteworthy that in terms of the magnitude, an unanticipated change
of   generally has diﬀerent macroeconomic impacts when both the gov-
ernment and private individuals increase liquidity risk aversion as opposed
to when only private individuals do. For example, suppose that two types
of economies initially have a common value of  . This happens when two
types of economies initially have common values of bA , R, and cT . In this
case, it is easy to see that the absolute value of  bA/   is larger when only
private individuals increase liquidity risk aversion. However, even in this
case,  (bA   bB – R)/   and  cT/   can be larger when both the govern-
ment and private individuals increase liquidity risk aversion because of the
eﬀect of  R/  . In other words, an increased aversion to liquidity risk may
lead to larger current account surplus in the short-run, and may lower so-
cial welfare when the government minimizes the costs from liquidity risk
and increases the amount of foreign reserves. The next section will investi-
gate this possibility by specifying the functional forms in the model.
2.5 Some Numerical Examples
In the last section, we explored what impacts an increased aversion to
liquidity risk have on current account and other macro variables when the
government minimizes the costs from liquidity risk. However, the magni-
tude is not necessarily clear without using speciﬁc functional forms. The
purpose of this section is to explore the quantitative impacts by specifying
the functional forms in the model.
In the experiment, we use the following functional forms:
(18a) U(ct
T, ct






















  0, otherwise, 
(18c) CG(bt





















  0, otherwise,
In (18a), the utility from consumption represents the case where an elas-
ticity of substitution in consumption between the tradable good and the
nontradable good equals to one. The disutility functions (18b) and (18c)
imply that the satiation ratio of bt
A/Rtis D/ for the private agent and DG/ G
for the government.
50 Shin-ichi Fukuda and Yoshifumi KonTo explore the impacts of unanticipated changes of   and  G, we set the
structural parameters as   0.7,   0.9,   10, rB– r A   0.05, r   0.01,
G* 1.5, D 1.05, and DG 1 and domestic outputs as yT yN 10. We
also set that R 15 when the government does not choose Rendogenously.
These parameters and variables remain constant throughout the period.
However, at period  , there was an unanticipated preference shock in hold-
ing liquid foreign debt, and the value of   and   G increased from 1 to 1.1
permanently. Then, when bt
A   bt
B   ct
T before period  , the equilibrium
values of macro variables are summarized in tables 2.2–2.4.
Table 2.2reports the case where the government does not respond to the
shock, while table 2.3 reports the case where the government responds to





table 2.2. In contrast, in table 2.3, the changes of   and  G increase Rt sub-
stantially and cause large declines of ct
T, pt
N, and bt
A   bt
B – Rt. As we dis-
cussed in the last section, it is not clear in general what impacts the changes
of   and  G have when both private individuals and the government re-
spond to the shock. However, table 2.3 indicates that under the parameter





Bat period   1, decrease ct
Tand pt
Nat period  , and lead
to a temporal current account surplus at period  . We can also see that the
changes of these macrovariables are substantial in table 2.3. For example,
tradable good consumption declines at period  only by less than 1 percent
in table 2.2 but nearly 10 percent in table 2.3. A large decline of bt
A   bt
B –
Rt in table 2.3 implies that the economy runs larger substantial current ac-
count surplus when the government also responds to the shock than when
only the private individuals respond.
However, each of bt
A and bt
B shows a dramatic change even when only
private individuals respond to the shock. That is, bt
A declined by about 10
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Table 2.2 The impacts of an increase in  : Numerical examples when R is always constant.
Rb A bB bA + bB CA cT pN (x10)
period   – 1 15.00 16.38 7.01 23.39 0.00 8.39 1.80
period   15.00 16.38 7.01 23.39 0.07 8.32 1.78
period   + 1 15.00 14.84 8.48 23.32 0.00 8.32 1.78
Table 2.3 The impacts of an increase in  : Numerical examples when R is always 
endogenously chosen.
Rb A bB bA + bB CA cT pN (x10)
period   – 1 14.86 15.60 6.26 21.86 0.00 7.00 9.85
period   14.86 15.60 6.26 21.86 0.64 6.36 9.55
period   + 1 26.77 15.56 7.58 33.14 0.00 6.36 9.55percent and bt
B increased by about 20 percent in table 2.2. This reﬂects the
fact that the increased aversion to liquidity risk causes a shift from liquid
debt to illiquid debt when private individuals try to reduce the risk. When
the government responds to the shock, bt
A and bt
B also show signiﬁcant
changes in the table. However, both bt
A and bt
B increase in table 2.3. It is not
clear in general whether the increased liquidity aversion increases bt
Aor not
when both private individuals and the government respond to the shock.
But if the government increased Rt and reduced the liquidity risk, the
private individuals would have less incentive to shift their debts from liquid
ones to illiquid ones. Table 2.3 shows that this eﬀect can dominate the other
under some reasonable parameter set.
The diﬀerent responses of bt
A and bt
B may have interesting implications
when the private individuals respond to the shock ﬁrst and then the gov-
ernment follows it. In this case, the increased liquidity aversion would have
very diﬀerent impacts before or after the government responds. Table 2.4
summarizes the changes of macro variables under the circumstance. In
table 2.4, we still assume the parameter set and exogenous variables speci-
ﬁed above. But we suppose that before period 1, the economy was in the
steady state where only private individuals maximized. At period 1, there
was an unanticipated shock and the value of   increased from 1 to 1.1 per-
manently. At period 1, only private individuals respond to the shock, while
the government keeps foreign reserves constant. The changes of the vari-
ables from period 0 to period 1 are thus exactly the same as those in table
2.2. However, after period 2,  G increased from 1 to 1.1 permanently and
the government also starts to respond to the shock so as to minimize the
loss function. The steady state values are thus adjusted to those in table 2.3.
It is noteworthy that the introduction of the government’s minimization
reduces the amount of tradable good consumption from 8.32 to 6.36 in
table 2.4. This implies that the welfare of the representative agent is not
necessarily enhanced by the government’s optimization. In fact, when   
 G   1 permanently, we can conﬁrm that the introduction of the govern-
ment’s optimization reduces the lifetime utility of the representative agent
from 10.4 to 9.9. This is partly because the government’s loss function is
diﬀerent from that of the private agent. However, low real interest of for-
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Table 2.4 The impacts of an increase in  : Numerical examples when the government responds
only after period 2.
Rb A bB bA + bB CA cT pN (x10)
period 0 15.00 16.38 7.01 23.39 0.00 8.39 1.80
period 1 15.00 16.38 7.01 23.39 0.07 8.32 1.78
period 2 15.00 14.84 8.48 23.32 1.95 6.36 9.55
period 3 26.77 25.56 7.58 33.14 0.00 6.36 9.55eign reserves is another crucial factor that reduces the welfare of the rep-
resentative agent. The accumulation of foreign reserves is useful in reduc-
ing the liquidity risk for the representative agent. However, since the accu-
mulation of foreign reserves reduces available resources, it may deteriorate
the welfare of the representative agent through reducing consumption of
tradable goods.
2.6 Some Evidence in East Asia
After the Asian crisis, most Asian economies came to recognize that eco-
nomic growth that relies on liquid external borrowings is not desirable,
given their vulnerability to a sudden reversal of capital ﬂows. Soon after the
crisis, they thus started to increase liquidity as an important self-protection
against crises. Our theoretical model, however, implies that they had alter-
native strategies for the self-protection depending on whether the govern-
ment cares about liquidity risk or not.
Based on the data in BIS Quarterly Review, ﬁgure 2.2reports the changes
of short-term, medium-term, and long-term borrowings in seven East
Asian economies before and after the crisis. Reﬂecting dramatic capital in-
ﬂows into East Asia before the crisis, we can observe large increases of all
types of debts in 1995 and 1996. We can also observe that there were sub-
stantial declines of short-term borrowings not only during the crisis, but
for some periods after the crisis. The declines of short-term borrowings
during the crisis clearly happened because of capital ﬂight under the pan-
icking crisis. It is, however, noteworthy that the declines of short-term bor-
rowings continued even in 1998, when East Asian economies started their
economic recovery. At the same time, there were dramatic increases of
medium-term borrowings and some increases of long-term borrowings in
several East Asian economies after the crisis.
These results indicate that many East Asian economies shifted their bor-
rowings from liquid short-term debt to illiquid long-term debts soon after
the crisis. However, the shift from liquid debt to illiquid debt did not per-
sist. Instead, liquid short-term debt increased again in the early 2000s. Ko-
rea was the only East Asian country that had signiﬁcant increases of short-
term borrowings since the late 1990s. But several East Asian economies
also experienced increases of their short-term borrowings in the early
2000s. In contrast, in the East Asian economies, medium-term debt and
long-term debt slowed in growth and sometimes declined during the same
period. This indicates that many East Asian economies may have reversed
their maturity structures, shifting their borrowings from illiquid long-term
debt to liquid short-term debt.
An essentially similar result can be obtained from the alternative data set
in Global Development Finance issued by the World Bank. Table 2.5 sum-
marizes average maturity of private credits to six East Asian countries
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C, Long-term
Source: Table 9A in BIS Quarterly Review (June 12, 2006).
Notes: The data are percent changes of international claims from a year earlier in average
amounts outstanding. Short-term is up to and including one year, medium-term is 1 up to 2
years, and long-term is over 2 years.
C
B
Afrom 1995 to 2004. In the East Asian countries, the average maturity in-
creased during the crisis and remained high until late 1999. This indicates
signiﬁcant shifts from liquid short-term debt to illiquid long-term debt
soon after the crisis. However, as in ﬁgure 2.2, Korea reduced average ma-
turity in the late 1990s. The other East Asian countries also gradually re-
duced maturity in the early 2000s. This alternative data set also supports
the view that many East Asian economies may have reversed their maturity
structures in the early 2000s.
Since short-term borrowing is liquid debt and medium-term and long-
term borrowings are illiquid debts, shifting their debt from short-term to
long-term is consistent with the case in our theoretical model where only
private agents responded to the increased aversion to liquidity risk. In con-
trast, increasing their short-term borrowings and decreasing long-term
borrowings are consistent with the case in the model where the government
also responded. The above evidence suggests that in East Asia, the former
case prevailed soon after the crisis but the latter became dominant in the
early 2000s.
Among the strategies for self-protection, replacing liquid short-term
debt by illiquid long-term debt was one of the most popular pieces of ad-
vice that many economists suggested for developing countries. However,
what step most Asian economies eventually took was to raise foreign re-
serves. Table 2.6reports the ratios of foreign exchange reserves to GDP for
ten East Asian economies (Japan, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Taiwan) from 1990 to
2004. It shows that the ratios went up substantially after the crisis and
showed further increases in the early 2000s, except for Indonesia. The ra-
tios are now over 10 percent in all East Asian economies and over 20 per-
cent except for Japan, Indonesia, and the Philippines. It is highly possible
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Table 2.5 Average maturity of new commitments in private credit to East Asia
China Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand
1995 7.3 11.0 5.8 16.9 10.9 8.9
1996 7.0 11.5 12.3 18.1 13.9 7.9
1997 6.4 16.1 6.6 12.7 14.4 10.9
1998 11.1 n.a. 6.4 13.7 6.3 6.8
1999 10.9 14.3 5.1 10.3 13.5 8.8
2000 10.5 6.9 4.6 7.6 11.4 7.3
2001 10.2 8.0 4.1 11.6 4.7 5.9
2002 10.1 9.4 10.2 9.4 4.3
2003 8.7 7.9 6.1 8.3 4.7
2004 9.0 8.2 8.3 8.5 5.0
Source: Global Development Finance, The World Bank.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.that the accumulated foreign reserves discouraged the private agents to re-
place liquid short-term debt by illiquid long-term debt in these economies.
One may argue that the rapid rise in reserves in recent years has little to
do with the self-insurance motive, but is instead related to policymakers’
desire to prevent the appreciation of their currencies and maintain the
competitiveness of their tradable sectors. The aggressive intervention
could maintain the competitiveness of their tradable sectors and manifest
itself in the massive accumulation of foreign reserves by Asian central
banks. This argument may be relevant in explaining China’s reserve accu-
mulation, where de facto dollar peg has been maintained for a long time.
To some extent, it may also explain recent reserve accumulation in the
other East Asian economies. However, it may not explain why the dramatic
rise in foreign reserves started to happen after the crisis, because the poli-
cymakers had an incentive to maintain the trade competitiveness even be-
fore the crisis.
2.7 An Implication for the U.S. Current Account Deﬁcits
In previous sections, we provided some theoretical and empirical analy-
ses on the changes in international capital ﬂows in East Asian economies
after the currency crisis in 1997. The analyses were motivated by what hap-
pened in East Asia after the crisis. However, the changes of capital ﬂows in
East Asia will have a special implication for the U.S. current account when
the government accumulates foreign reserves. This is because the U.S. dol-
lar is the dominant reserve currency in international capital market, so that
it became indispensable for developing countries to accumulate the U.S.
government bonds that would make crises less likely.
Unfortunately, each government keeps the currency composition of the
foreign exchange reserves a well-guarded secret. But IMF annual report
provides average currency composition for industrialized countries and
developing countries every year. In addition, Tavlas and Ozeki (1991) re-
ported average currency composition for selected Asian countries in the
1980s.2 Table 2.7 summarizes the reported currency compositions. The
shares of the U.S. dollar have been high in both industrialized and devel-
oping countries. In particular, the shares of the U.S. dollar in developing
countries were close to 70 percent from 1991 to 2001. Although updated
data is not available for the selected Asian countries, more than half of
these reserves are likely to have been invested in the United States, typically
U.S. treasuries or other safe U.S. assets.
Some comparable data sets are also available from the U.S. side. The U.S.
Treasury does have estimates of major foreign holders of treasury securi-
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2. Tavlas and Ozeki (1991) did not clarify which countries they included in their selected
Asian countries. China is likely to be excluded in their estimates.ties holdings from 2000 to 2005. Table 2.8 summarizes the estimates for
Japan, China, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Thailand. The
changes of treasury securities holdings were modest in Hong Kong, Singa-
pore, and Thailand. However, there were dramatic increases of treasury se-
curities holdings in China and Japan. In Korea and Taiwan, the amount of
treasury securities holdings was more than doubled from 2000 to 2005. Al-
though the data includes both oﬃcial and private holdings, it is more likely
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Table 2.7 Ofﬁcial holdings of foreign exchange (in percent)
1980 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004
U.S. dollar
Industrial countries 54.3 57.0 48.4 51.2 75.3 71.5
Developing countries 58.1 57.0 60.5 61.8 68.2 59.9
Selected Asian countries 48.6 58.2 56.4 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Japanese yen
Industrial countries 2.1 5.3 7.5 8.3 6.7 3.6
Developing countries 4.9 4.1 6.9 8.2 6.0 4.3
Selected Asian countries 13.9 16.3 17.5 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Pound sterling
Industrial countries 0.5 1.4 1.2 2.3 2.2 1.9
Developing countries 5.3 4.1 5.8 4.9 3.7 4.8
Selected Asian countries 3.0 3.5 6.4 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Deutsche mark
Industrial countries 9.4 12.9 20.6 16.4 — —
Developing countries 15.4 8.8 11.7 11.8 — —
Selected Asian countries 20.6 14.6 15.2 n.a. — —
ECUs or Euro
Industrial countries 29.0 20.6 15.0 14.1 16.1 20.9
Developing countries 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.9 29.2
Selected Asian countries 0.0 0.0 0.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Swiss franc
Industrial countries 1.1 1.2 1.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
Developing countries 4.8 2.6 2.2 2.0 0.4 0.2
Selected Asian countries 10.6 4.9 3.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
French franc
Industrial countries 0.0 0.4 1.1 2.1 — —
Developing countries 2.6 1.7 2.1 2.1 — —
Selected Asian countries 0.6 0.6 0.5 n.a. — —
Netherlands guilder
Industrial countries 0.4 0.6 1.1 0.2 — —
Developing countries 1.3 0.9 1.0 0.9 — —
Selected Asian countries 2.8 1.9 0.9 n.a. — —
Other currencies
Industrial countries 3.2 0.7 4.0 5.3 1.4 2.0
Developing countries 7.6 20.8 9.9 8.3 1.7 1.6
Selected Asian countries 0.0 0.0 0.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sources: Except for selected Asian countries, IMF Annual Report. For selected Asian countries, Tavlas
and Ozeki (1991).that recent increases in central bank reserves account for a large share of
those assets.3 The reserves, which are typically held in the form of U.S.
Treasury bills and agency bonds, pay a low rate of return. It is less likely
that private investors accumulated such low interest assets.
The evidence supports the view that substantial rises in foreign exchange
reserves increase capital inﬂows into the United States. It is, however, note-
worthy that similar capital inﬂows from East Asia would not happen out-
side the United States when the East Asian economies adopt the strategy
of replacing liquid short-term debt by illiquid long-term debt for self-
protection. In fact, several East Asian economies came to run frequent
trade balance deﬁcits against other countries in the early 2000s. For ex-
ample, Korea’s trade balance against non-U.S. countries was in deﬁcit in
2001 and 2002. China and Thailand have run deﬁcit against non-U.S.
countries since 2000. The change of the strategies from the late 1990s to the
early 2000s may explain why the East Asian economies widened their trade
account surpluses only against the United States in the 2000s.
Needless to say, our results do not necessarily deny alternative views in
explaining recent increases in the U.S. current account deﬁcits. One may
argue that the recent deterioration in the U.S. current account primarily re-
ﬂects economic policies and other economic developments within the
United States itself. One popular argument for the “made in the U.S.A.” ex-
planation of the rising current account deﬁcit focuses on the burgeoning
U.S. federal budget deﬁcit. That inadequate U.S. national saving is the
source of declining national saving and the current account deﬁcit must be
true at some level. However, the so-called twin-deﬁcits hypothesis, that
government budget deﬁcits cause current account deﬁcits, does not ac-
count for the fact that the U.S. external deﬁcit expanded by about $300 bil-
lion between 1996 and 2000, a period during which the federal budget was
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3. When Treasuries are resold, it is diﬃcult to identify who holds what U.S. Treasury secu-
rities. Private custodial transactions on behalf of governments also cloud matters.
Table 2.8 Major foreign holders of U.S. treasury securities
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Japan 317.7 317.9 378.1 550.8 689.9 671
China 60.3 78.6 118.4 159 222.9 310.9
Korea 29.6 32.8 38 63.1 55 68.9
Taiwan 33.4 35.3 37.4 50.9 67.9 68.1
Hong Kong 38.6 47.7 47.5 50 45.1 40.3
Singapore 27.9 20 17.8 21.2 30.4 33
Thailand 13.8 15.7 17.2 11.7 12.5 16.1
Source: http://www.ustreas.gov/tic/mfhhis01.txt.
Note: All data are those in the end of December. Units in billions of U.S. dollars.in surplus and projected to remain so. It seems unlikely, therefore, that
changes in the U.S. government budget position can entirely explain the
behavior of the U.S. current account over the past decade (see also Erceg,
Guerrieri, and Gust 2005). The U.S. national saving is currently very low
and falls considerably short of domestic capital investment. Of necessity,
this shortfall is made up by net foreign borrowing. The increased capital
ﬂows from the East Asian economies to the U.S. economy may provide one
of the promising answers to the question of why the United States has been
borrowing so heavily in international capital markets.
2.8 Implications for Real Exchange Rates
One of the byproducts of our theoretical analysis is the impacts of in-
creased liquidity risk aversion on the real exchange rate. If recent current
account surpluses in East Asia primarily reﬂect either an increase in the
U.S. demand for East Asian products or increased productivity of East
Asian exports, they would naturally lead to currency appreciation of East
Asian currencies in a world of ﬂoating exchange rates. However, when the
economy increases its liquidity risk aversion, large current account sur-
pluses could persist for long years accompanied by the real exchange rate
depreciation. This is particularly true for current account surplus against
the United States, the currency of which has been widely held as an inter-
national reserve currency. The purpose of this section is to investigate these
implications empirically. Figure 2.3 reports real exchange rates of eight
East Asian economies from 1990 to 2004. In the ﬁgure, lower values mean
depreciation. It shows that except for China, the real exchange rates de-
preciated substantially against the U.S. dollar after the crisis and remained
low even after the economies recovered from the crisis. The rate of depre-
ciation from 1996 to 2004 is more than 20 percent in Korea, Thailand,
Malaysia, and the Philippines.
The basic result still remains true even when we use absolute PPP data to
evaluate the real exchange rates after the crisis. By using the balanced panel
data of the Penn World Table (PWT 6.2) from 1990 to 2003, we estimated
the simple following logarithmic equation over the 2000 observations:
(19) log Pj/PU.S.   constant   a   log Yj/YU.S.,
where Pj/PU.S. is the price level of country jrelative to the United States, and
Yj/YU.S. is country j’s income level relative to the United States. We included
log Yj/YU.S. in the regression because Rogoﬀ (1996) found that the Balassa-
Samuelson eﬀect leads to a clear positive association between relative price
levels and real incomes.
To examine the real exchange rate depreciation in East Asia after the cri-
sis, we include the post-crisis dummy and the post-crisis East Asian dummy.
The post-crisis dummy is a time dummy that takes one from 1998 to 2003
and zero otherwise. The post-crisis East Asian dummy is an East Asian re-
60 Shin-ichi Fukuda and Yoshifumi Kongional dummy times a post-crisis dummy that takes one from 1999 to 2003
only for eleven Asian economies (China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea,
Macao, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and Viet-
nam) and zero otherwise. We started the post-crisis East Asian dummy
from 1999 because the East Asian economies may have had a diﬀerent
strategy for the self-protection in 1998. Because China, former centrally
planned countries, and post-crisis Indonesia can be outliers, we also in-
clude the China dummy, the East Europe dummy, and the post-crisis In-
donesia dummy in some regressions. The China dummy or the East Europe
dummy takes one from 1990 to 2003 for China or two East Europe coun-
tries (Romania and Russia) and zero otherwise. The post-crisis Indonesia
dummy takes one from 1998 to 2003 for Indonesia and zero otherwise.
Table 2.9 reports the results of our regressions with and without the
three extra dummies. Like Rogoﬀ’s result, the coeﬃcient of the relative in-
come level always takes signiﬁcantly positive, showing a clear positive as-
sociation between relative price levels and real incomes. However, the co-
eﬃcients of the two time dummy variables are signiﬁcantly negative. The
negative coeﬃcient of the post-crisis dummy implies that there was world-
wide undervaluation of real exchange rates against the U.S. dollar after the
crisis. The negative coeﬃcient of the post-crisis East Asian dummy implies
that the degree of the undervaluation of the real exchange rates was more
conspicuous among the East Asian economies after the Asian crisis.
It is noteworthy that the negative coeﬃcient of the post-crisis East Asian
dummy is much larger than that of the post-crisis dummy in the absolute
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Fig. 2.3 Real exchange rates in East Asia
Sources: International Financial Statistics, IMF.
Notes: All real exchange rates are normalized to be 100 in 2000. “Real Exchange Rate” of
country c in year y   [pc,y   (ey/e2000)   100]/pUSA,y where e   nominal exchange rate (dollar
per national currency), p   except for China, Producer Price Index (for China, Consumer
Price Index). Lower values mean depreciation.value. The result is consistent with our theoretical model, where the East
Asian economies that increased the liquidity risk aversion had current ac-
count surpluses accompanied by the real exchange rate depreciation. The
result does not change even if we include the China dummy, the East Eu-
rope dummy, and the post-crisis Indonesia dummy. All of the three dum-
mies had signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcients.4 However, both the post-crisis
dummy and the post-crisis East Asian dummy kept having negative im-
pacts, implying undervaluation outside the United States and larger un-
dervaluation in East Asia after the crisis.
2.9 Concluding Remarks
During the last decade, ﬁnancial globalization has been accompanied by
frequent and painful ﬁnancial crises. Some of the well-known crises in-
clude Mexico in 1995, East Asia in 1997, Russia in 1998, Brazil in 1999, and
Argentina in 2002. During the crises, countries with smaller liquid foreign
assets had a hard time preventing panics in ﬁnancial markets and sudden
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4. The negative coeﬃcient of the China dummy implies that the Chinese Yuan had been un-
dervalued throughout the 1990s. It reconﬁrms the conclusion of Frankel (2005) that China’s
prices have been well below the level that one would predict from the Balassa-Samuelson
equation.
Table 2.9 The Balassa-Samuelson Regression
dependent variable logPj/PU.S.
constant –0.0996 –0.0881 –0.0889
(–5.66) (–5.07) (–5.13)
logYj/YU.S. 0.3420 0.3428 0.3423
(46.69) (47.49) (47.50)
post-crisis dummy –0.0991 –0.1007 –0.0976
(–5.60) (–5.78) (–5.60)
post-crisis East Asian dummy –0.3112 –0.2827 –0.2268
(–5.37) (–4.88) (–4.06)
China dummy –0.4125 –0.4179
(–3.70) (–3.74)
East Europe dummy –0.6340 –0.6352
(–8.14) (–8.18)
post-crisis Indonesia dummy –0.6101
(–3.48)
adj.R-squared 0.4898 0.5066 0.5102
Source: The Penn World Table (PWT 6.2), where Yj = nominal GDP per capita in country j,
and Pj = price level of Yj. The data was downloaded from http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/.
Notes:Number of observations is 2,338 (14 periods for 168 countries) for each regression.
Data period is from 1990 to 2003 (balanced panel). Eleven Asian countries are: China, Hong
Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Macao, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and
Vietnam. t-statistics are in parentheses.reversals in capital ﬂows. Many developing countries thus came to recog-
nize that increased liquidity is an important self-protection against crises.
However, developing countries have alternative strategies for the self-
protection. Replacing liquid short-term debt by illiquid long-term debt
and raising foreign reserves are two popular strategies that many econo-
mists advised. The ﬁrst strategy would be taken when private individuals
respond to the shock, because an increased aversion to liquidity risk
among private individuals reduces liquid debt and increases illiquid debt.
We found that the East Asian economies may have taken this course soon
after the crisis. However, we also found that what most Asian economies
have taken seriously in the 2000s is the second strategy. Under a reasonable
parameter set, it may lead to larger liquid debt, smaller illiquid debt, and
larger current account surpluses, accompanied by depreciation of the real
exchange rate when the government responds to an unanticipated increase
in the liquidity risk aversion. Macroeconomic impacts of the increased liq-
uidity risk aversion can be very diﬀerent depending on which strategy de-
veloping countries will take.
When looking at remarkable recent reversals in global capital ﬂows, East
Asian economies have been one of the major net lenders after the currency
crisis in 1997. Foreign exchange reserves held by East Asian economies are
now record-breaking, and stand at levels that are a multiple of those held
by advanced countries. In particular, because of the role of the U.S. dollar
as an international currency, it became indispensable for developing coun-
tries to accumulate the U.S. government bonds that would make crises less
likely. Consequently, after the crisis, the increased preference for interna-
tional liquidity allowed a large proportion of the U.S. current account
deﬁcit to be ﬁnanced by developing countries, especially East Asian econ-
omies. It is important to reconsider what impacts the increased liquidity
risk aversion in East Asia had on international capital ﬂows, including the
U.S. current account deﬁcit.
Needless to say, our model is too simple to describe a variety of macro-
economic phenomena in East Asia after the crisis. For example, our model
neglected the role of capital stock investment, which showed dramatic ﬂuc-
tuations before and after the crisis. It also did not take into account risk
premium for long-term debt that prevailed in emerging markets. Incorpo-
rating these factors is left for our future research.
References
Aizenman, J., and J. Lee. 2005. International reserves: Precautionary versus mer-
cantilist views, theory and evidence. NBER Working Paper no. 11366. Cam-
bridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Liquidity Risk Aversion, Debt Maturity, and Current Account Surpluses 63Bernanke, B. S. 2005. The global saving glut and the U.S. current account deﬁcit.
The Sandridge Lecture. Richmond, VA: Virginia Association of Economics.
Blanchard, O., F. Giavazzi, and F. Sa. 2005. The U.S. current account and the dol-
lar. NBER Working Paper no. 11137. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research.
Broner, F., G. Lorenzoni, and S. Schmukler. 2004. Why do emerging economies
borrow short term? Policy Research Working Paper Series no. 3389. The World
Bank.
Caballero, R., E. Farhi, and P.-O. Gourinchas. 2006. An equilibrium model of
“Global Imbalances” and low interest rates. NBER Working Paper no. 11996.
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Corsetti, G., P. Pesenti, and N. Roubini. 1999. What caused the Asian currency and
ﬁnancial crisis? Japan and the World Economy 11:305–73.
Dooley, M. P., D. Folkerts-Landau, and P. M. Garber. 2005. Savings gluts and in-
terest rates: The missing link to Europe. NBER Working Paper no. 11520. Cam-
bridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Erceg, C., L. Guerrieri, and C. Gust. 2005. Expansionary ﬁscal shocks and the
trade deﬁcit. International Finance Discussion Paper 2005–825. Washington,
DC: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Frankel, J. 2005. On the Renminbi: The choice between adjustment under a ﬁxed
exchange rate and adjustment under a ﬂexible rate. NBER Working Paper no.
11274. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Fukuda, S. 2001. The impacts of bank loans on economic development: An impli-
cation for East Asia from an equilibrium contract theory. In Regional and global
capital ﬂows: Macroeconomic causes and consequences, eds. T. Ito and A. O.
Krueger, 117–145. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Jeanne, O. 2004. Debt maturity and the international ﬁnancial architecture. IMF
Working Paper no. 04/137. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Obstfeld, M., and K. Rogoﬀ. 1997. Foundations of International Macroeconomics.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Obstfeld, M., and K. Rogoﬀ. 2004. The unsustainable U.S. current account posi-
tion revisited. NBER Working Paper no. 10869. Cambridge, MA: National Bu-
reau of Economic Research.
Rodrik, D. 2005. The social cost of foreign exchange reserves. International Eco-
nomic Journal 20 (3). Forthcoming.
Rodrik, D., and A. Velasco. 1999. Short-term capital ﬂows. NBER Working Paper
no. 7364. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Rogoﬀ, K. 1996. The purchasing power parity puzzle. Journal of Economic Litera-
ture 34 (2): 647–68.
Roubini, N., and B. Setser. 2004. The United States as a net debtor: The sustain-
ability of the U.S. external imbalances. Unpublished draft.
Sachs, J., and S. Radelet. 1998. The East Asian ﬁnancial crisis: Diagnosis, remedies,
prospects. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity Issue no. 1. Washington, DC:
Brookings Institute.
Schmukler, S., and E. Vesperoni. 2006. Financial globalization and debt maturity
in emerging economies. Journal of Development Economics 79:183–207.
Tavlas, G. S., and Y. Ozeki. 1991. The Japanese yen as an international currency. IMF
Working Paper no. WP/91/2. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
64 Shin-ichi Fukuda and Yoshifumi KonComment Linda S. Goldberg
The main goal of this chapter is to explore the consequences of heightened
demand for liquidity by Asian economies in the period following crises of
1997. The authors argue that this heightened demand led to appreciation
of the key international currency of liquidity, the U.S. dollar. To make this
point, the authors develop a model wherein a liquidity demand shock gen-
erates a period of persistent strength for the high liquidity asset and cur-
rency. The chapter is well-written and draws logical conclusions from its
modelling exercise.
My main comments on the chapter will focus on the speciﬁc application
of the chapter to the data since 1997. I then oﬀer some suggestions for ex-
panding the modeling to make this application conform more closely to re-
cent experience. I will make suggestions pertaining to the following
themes: (a) How can the authors supplement the model to provide richer
dynamics? (b) Is liquidity demand for dollars really the key issue in the last
decade, beyond perhaps the initial period of reserve accumulation in East
Asia? (c) If liquidity demand is so important, can the authors motivate why
there appears to have been such a bias towards dollars over, for example,
euros?
Supplementing the Model to Provide Richer Dynamics
Within the model of the chapter, utility from consumption of goods is a
substitute for utility from having liquid investments. Shocks to demand for
liquidity therefore lead to persistent consumption collapse. Savings rise,
consumption falls. The authors may consider providing more motivation
for their speciﬁc way of introducing a useful concept. One alternative
approach is to have more separability in utility from consumption and liq-
uidity, with the relevant margin of substitution instead to be between liq-
uid and illiquid investments.
Another aspect of the model that can be extended is the treatment of in-
vestment and production. Within the model, ﬁxed endowments are as-
sumed without any investment dynamics. It would be interesting to see a
richer approach to investment choices. This richer approach is especially
relevant since, with events in East Asia motivating the paper, we also ob-
serve a dynamics of real investment and output that have been an integral
part of recent events.
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The views in this discussion are those of the author and do not necessarily reﬂect the posi-
tion of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.Two recent papers present a nice treatment of investment and can sug-
gest useful ways to have more fully dynamic modelling of investment and
exchange rates. Within a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium approach
(DSGE), the paper by Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust (2006) is useful. If you
want a model with rudimentary portfolio choice and exogenous risk pre-
miums, which like the Fukuda and Kon chapter doesn’t capture reasons for
a sudden change in appetite for risk, the work by Faruqee, Laxton, Muir
and Pesenti (2005) is carefully speciﬁed.
Interpreting the Empirics
Within the Fukuda and Kon chapter, increased liquidity demand shows
up in growth of foreign exchange reserves relative to GDP across East
Asia. This growth in foreign exchange reserves probably played a substan-
tial role during the ﬁrst year or two after the crisis. Yet, how do the authors
explain the continued accumulation of reserves by the same countries? The
liquidity argument has a substantially diﬀerent emphasis than arguments
focused on the “global savings glut.”
The authors present some regression analysis. This section could be ex-
panded, with more discussion of both the testing methodology and inter-
pretation of the results. One point that could be addressed is why and if the
authors view the demand for liquidity exclusively as a post-Asia crisis phe-
nomenon? Why would this demand not arise for larger groups of countries
and across other crises?
Overall, in thinking about the emphasis of the paper, it is important to
determine the importance of liquidity demandin recent imbalances and the
duration of its eﬀects. According to the International Monetary Fund’s
WEO Report for 2005, a key feature of the East Asia events instead in-
volves a focus on investment rates.
Investment rates have fallen across virtually all industrial country re-
gions, although this has been most noticeable in Japan and the euro area
countries, where they reached historic lows in 2002....  I n  v olume terms,
the fall in average investment rates in industrial countries has been more
modest.
Investment rates diﬀer substantially across emerging market econo-
mies . . . With the exception of China and a handful of other countries,
however, investment rates have fallen in emerging market economies
since the Asian ﬁnancial crisis. Indeed, investment rates in East Asia
have declined by more than 10 percentage points of GDP since their
peak in the mid-1990s and have not rebounded. WEO 2005, Ch. 2.
These observations support the suggestion made earlier in these com-
ments that the authors should provide a richer modeling of investment in
the paper. For example, when we examine data for the United States in ﬁg-
66 Shin-ichi Fukuda and Yoshifumi Konure 2C.1,the growth in the current account deﬁcit, deﬁned as the diﬀerence
between national savings and investment, is dominated by low national
savings since 2000.
Figure 2C.2 shows the savings and investment by Asia, outside of China
since 1990. Observe the interesting dynamics of savings and investment in
this region in the period from 1997 to 2006. The model of the paper pre-
dicts substitution between consumption and liquidity, while investment is
stable. Yet in the data we observe a reduction in savings and an even larger
collapse in investment spending.
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Fig. 2C.1 United States: Savings and Investment
Source: IMF April 2006 World Economic Outlook, OECD, authors’ calculations. 2006 values
are based on IMF WEO and OECD forecasts.
Fig. 2C.2 Asia outside China: Savings and investment
Source: IMF April 2006 World Economic Outlook, OECD, authors’ calculations. 2006 values
are based on IMF WEO and OECD forecasts.If the dollar strength post-1997 is a focal point of the modeling exercise,
and liquidity demand from Asia is emphasized, it is useful to provide con-
text on the extent to which global current account balances are dominated
by particular regions. As shown in table 2C.1 in the early 2000s (for ex-
ample 2002) the surpluses of Emerging Asia and Japan accounted for
more than half of the current account deﬁcit of the United States. This
situation changed by the mid-2000s, when the surpluses of oil exporters
basically matched those of emerging Asia and Japan. Could it still be that
the strength of dollar was attributable to liquidity demand at this time?
The authors of the paper could elaborate more on the timing and strength
of the liquidity motive behind a demand for dollars in the period well af-
ter 1997.
Why is liquidity demand biased towards dollars over, for example, euros?
The arguments of the paper lead Asian economies to purchase dollars,
and generate an associated dollar appreciation in the wake of strong liq-
uidity demands. It would be useful to have more exposition of why this liq-
uidity demand is so strongly biased toward dollars, instead of euros, for ex-
ample. Evidence on bid-ask spreads in foreign exchange markets may be
informative, as would information on the depth of dollar versus euro bond
markets.
Is it because of the low transaction costs of operating in dollar markets,
and the prevalence of the dollar in trade invoicing? Goldberg and Tille
(2006) argue that the special role of the dollar in international markets
makes for asymmetric eﬀects of exchange rates across the U.S. and its trad-
ing partners. Models need to recognize such asymmetry, when conse-
quences for dollars, rather than alternative currencies, are postdated.
68 Shin-ichi Fukuda and Yoshifumi Kon
Table 2C.1 Global current account balances
2002 2005 Change
Surpluses
Oil Exportersa 88 398 310
Emerging Asia 128 241 113
Japan 113 164 51
Western Europeb 52 23 –29
Others + Errors 95 –20 –116
Deﬁcit
United States –475 –805 –330
Sources: IMF September 2005 World Economic Outlook, national sources.
Note:Figures in billions of U.S. dollars.
aIMF WEO fuel exporters plus Norway.
bEMU plus Denmark, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Switzerland.Conclusions
This well-written and thought-provoking paper focuses our attention on
the special position of and eﬀects on countries with highly liquid assets.
The demand for liquidity appears to have been especially important in the
immediate aftermath of the Asian crises of 1997. The challenge for the au-
thors is to make the paper both more speciﬁc and more general at the same
time. More speciﬁc to this event means that we could have richer modelling
of investment decisions—the liquidity versus consumption trade-oﬀs. It
could be more general in the sense that we would like to see whether this
liquidity demand phenomenon was present in other crises and observe
how it was manifested. If not, the model and empirical application may be
able to tell us why.
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Comment Andrew K. Rose
This is an interesting paper on an important set of related issues that has
been much discussed in the literature of late. The authors are interested in
whether the American current account deﬁcit is fundamentally sustain-
able. Linked to this is the question of how special the United States is since
it happens to be the country that issues the world’s favored reserve cur-
rency (at least the current favorite). Alternatively expressed, are the funda-
mental causes of “global imbalances” mostly American or foreign? Mostly
permanent or transitory? I congratulate the authors for a stimulating piece
of work on such a relevant and topical set of issues.
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Berkeley and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.While praise is appropriate, the role of the discussant is intrinsically crit-
ical. I want to begin by pointing out three strategic choices the authors
made that I would have made diﬀerently.
The ﬁrst place where I diverge from the authors is in the approach they
take to modeling the exogenous parameter shock that starts the ball
rolling. Why exactly does the taste for foreign liquidity suddenly rise? Why
is the taste limited to Asian countries? And why does it take place when it
does? To me, if the fundamental source of the shock was the Asian crisis
(as seems perfectly reasonable), then this should be modeled more directly.
As it is, assuming that there is a shock to preferences for net foreign assets
of a speciﬁc currency seems perilously close to assuming the solution to the
problem of interest. It is also restrictive, since it doesn’t allow one to really
address the question of what’s special about the United States other than
by assumption.
A separate issue is the implicit linkage in the paper between bilateral and
multilateral balances—or, more precisely, between trade and ﬁnancial im-
balances. In the paper, a country that develops a taste for the assets of, for
example, the United States runs a current account surplus vis-à-vis the
United States. That seems natural—but only at ﬁrst. Usually we model bi-
lateral trade ﬂows independently of the aggregate trade balance; a country
may have a deﬁcit vis-à-vis a particular country and still run an aggregate
surplus. More importantly, we also usually model trade in goods (and ser-
vices) independently of trade in assets. I can obtain euros by running a sur-
plus vis-à-vis Japan and then trading the yen for euros. So the setup here is
restrictive and at odds with the literature. That’s not necessarily bad, of
course, it’s simply worth pointing out (and defending).
The ﬁnal and most important issue, at least to me, is whether we really be-
lieve that agents get utility from holding net foreign assets. I am not wholly
convinced that this is intrinsically plausible. It seems hard for me to believe
that net foreign assets (NFA) deliver welfare in a way similar to the satis-
faction I get from consuming goods and services. Do I really beneﬁt from
NFA per se, that is assets that aren’tconverted into goods and services? Even
if I do, isn’t there satiation in NFA? Do the net foreign assets of diﬀerent
countries really yield substantially diﬀerent utility? Do Asians have diﬀer-
ent tastes for NFA than say Europeans, and does this really vary a lot over
time? Could the size of this eﬀect be comparable to that from goods? After
all,   and   are big in the paper (as recognized by the authors). Finally, if
NFA holdings are inherently valuable, why do so few countries seek to in-
crease them by reducing liabilities (as opposed to increasing reserves)? All
this strikes me as a set of issues worthy of discussion in future work.
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